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Abstract
This note gives an easily verified necessary and sufficient condition
for one probability forecaster to empirically outperform another
one in terms of all strictly proper scoring rules.
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1 The problem and notation
Probability forecasting has a long and distinguished history in meteorology and
medicine. Due to the increasing importance of default predictions in the credit
industry, it has recently become important also in economics, so the subsequent
discussion is couched in terms of default probabilities for corporate bonds.
Let 0 = a1 < a2 < . . . < ak = 1 be k predicted probabilities of default.
We circumvent the problem of converting conventional letter grades such as
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AAA into predicted probabilities of default by equating the latter to historical
default frequencies below. This note is not concerned with the intricacies of
correctly mapping letter grades probabilities of default, but with assessing the
empirical performance of competing rating agencies.
Let q(ai) be the relative frequency with which default probability forecast ai
is made and let p(ai) be the conditional relative frequency of default given
probability forecast ai. Given two rating agencies A and B who rate the same
n borrowers, with frequency functions qA(ai), q
B(ai), p
A(ai) and p
B(ai), it is
then natural to ask whose forecasts have been better? Below it is shown that,
in a sense, an unequivocal answer is possible if and only if A and B can be
ranked according to the ”empirical refinement ordering”. Otherwise, there will
always exist two strictly proper scoring rules such that one prefers A to B and
the other prefers B to A.
2 The empirical refinement ordering
DeGroot and Fienberg (1983) introduce the refinement ordering among well
calibrated probability forecasters. A probability forecaster is called well cali-
brated if, among borrowers with predicted default probability ai, the long-run
relative percentage of defaults is equal to ai:
ai = p(ai). (2.1)
A well calibrated forecaster A is called ”more refined” than B, in symbols:
A ≥R B, if there exists a k×kMarkov matrixM (i.c. a matrix with nonnegative
entries whose columns seems to unity) such that
qB(ai) =
k∑
j=1
Mijq
A(aj) (2.2)
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and
aiq
B(ai) =
k∑
j=1
Mijajq
A(aj) (i = 1, . . . , k). (2.3)
Equation (2.2) means that, given A’s forecast aj, an additional independent
randomisation is applied according to the conditional distribution Mij (j =
1, ..., k) which produces forecasts with the same probability function as that of
B. Condition (2.3) ensures that the resulting forecast is again well calibrated.
Below, calibration is ensured by equating observed default rates to predicted
ones. A forecaster who then dominates another one in the refinement sense is
called ”empirically more refined”.
The crucial point for the subsequent discussion, first observed by DeGroot and
Eriksson (1985), is that A ≥R B is equivalent to the fact that the distribution
qA(ai) second-order stochastically dominates the distribution q
B(ai). This al-
lows to tap the vast literature on necessary and sufficient conditions for second
order stochastic domination. In particular, we can use a theorem dating back
to Hardy, Littlewood and Polya (1929) which states that A ≥R B if and only
if
k∑
i=1
g(ai)q
A(ai) ≥
k∑
i=1
g(ai)q
B(ai) (2.4)
for all continuous, convex functions g on the unit interval. This key inequality
is now related to scalar measures of forecasting performance known as scoring
rules.
3 Strictly proper scoring rules
Let θi(i = 1, . . . , n) be an indicator variable taking the value 1 if borrower i
defaults and 0 otherwise, and let Pi ∈ {a1, . . . , ak} be the default probability
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attached to borrower i. A scoring rule is a function F (θ1, . . . , θn; p1, . . . , pn)
which is designed to measure the performance of a forecast. Examples are the
Brier-Score
B = − 1
n
n∑
j=1
(pi − θi)2, (3.5)
the logarithmic score
L = − 1
n
n∑
i=1
`n(|pi + θi − 1|) (3.6)
or the spherical score
S =
1
n
n∑
i=1
|pi + θi − a|√
p2i + 1− pi)2
(3.7)
(see e.g. Winkler 1996). A scoring rule can also be viewed as a random variable
which takes a value S1(p) if the forecaster reports a predicted probability p for
the event in question and the event actually occurs, and which takes a value
S2(p) if the event in question does not occur. For the Brier-score, we have
S1(p) = −(p−1)2 and S2(p) = −p2. A scoring rule is called ”strictly proper” if
its expectation, given the subjective probability distribution of the forecaster,
is maximized if and only if the probability forecasts are equal to the subjective
probabilities. All scoring rules above are strictly proper.
A key result about proper scoring rules, due to Savage (1971), states that a
scoring rule is strictly proper if and only if the subjectively expected score for
a forecaster who reports his true subjective probabilities, viewed as a function
of p, is a strictly convex function. For the Brier-score, for instance, we have
E[B(p)] = −[p(p− 1)2 + p2(1− p)] = −[p(1− p)]. (3.8)
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Also, any strictly convex function on the unit interval induces a strictly proper
scoring rule via
S1(p) = E[S(p)] + (1− p)dE[S(p)]/dp (3.9)
and
S2(p) = E[S(p)]− pdE[S(p)]/dp (3.10)
(see Winkler 1996, section 3).
In the credit rating context, default probabilities are often equated to ob-
served default frequencies. For this to make sense, the sample has to be quite
large, of course. Then it is natural to evaluate scoring rules by attaching to
borrower i the observed frequency of the grade borrower i has been sorted into.
THEOREM: If predicted default probabilities are equal to observed
default rates, then forecaster A outperforms forecaster B according to all
strictly proper scoring rules if and only if A is empirically more refined than B.
PROOF: The key to the proof of the theorem is to show that all empiri-
cally computed proper scoring rules, which are initially defined as functions
of θ1, . . . , θn and p1, . . . , pn, depend on these inputs only via a1, . . . , ak and
some strictly convex function g. To see this, note that pi is by definition equal
to the empirical default rate of grade aj ∈ {a1, . . . , ak} which has been as-
signed to borrower i. Then the forecaster is by definition well calibrated, and
a percentage q(aj) of the predicted p’s are equal to aj. For these p’s and the
corresponding θ’s, the observed score is equal to the expected score, computed
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under the assumption that the realized default rate in class ai corresponds to
the predicted one:
S(θ1, . . . , θn; p1, . . . , pn) =
k∑
j=1
q(aj)[ajS1(aj) + (1− aj)S2(aj)], (3.11)
where
g(a) := aS1(a) + (1− a)S2(a) (3.12)
is a strictly convex function in view of Savage (1971). The assertion of the
theorem then immediately follows from (2.4).
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